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Abstract 
 
In describing the mind’s place in the physical world, philosophers have produced a diversity of views. 
On the far right of the spectrum we find substance dualists, who think that there is in addition to 
physical substance, mental substance. A little to the left strong property dualists claim that while there 
is only physical substance, there are in addition to physical properties, mental properties. These two 
views broadly represent accounts of mind on which physicalism is explicitly considered false. Among 
those who think physicalism is true, are reductionists and non-reductionists. The former sit on the far 
left, claiming that there is only physical substance and that mental properties just are physical 
properties. Non-reductionists are at the center; rejecting the possibility of reduction, claiming that 
mental properties are distinct from physical ones, while resisting anti-physicalist claims about mental 
properties and substance.  
 
In this paper I will argue that this spectrum needs to be substantially revised. In particular I will argue 
that non-reductive views are unavailable and that strong property dualist views are problematically 
related to views that are dualistic about substance. I will present an alternative physicalist view that 
does not appear on the above-mentioned spectrum. I will not provide an outright defense of the view, 
but I will argue that it is worth further consideration because it enables us to avoid many of the 
difficulties commonly associated with the abovementioned views. Ultimately the view’s success will 
be determined by the possibility of accounting for subjective properties of phenomenal experience in 
terms of objective physical ones. It is beyond the scope of this paper to pronounce on this matter, but I 
will argue that if one thinks that the difference between the subjectivity of experience and the 
objectivity of physical properties is due to anything more than shortcomings in human explanatory 
capabilities, one is really endorsing a non-physicalist position. In this way, I hope to show that the 
best chance for a future physicalism lies in the alternative view that I offer here.  
 
